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Abstract 
Since decolonization, Sub-Saharan Africa has seen the birth of a large number of regional 
initiatives whose institutional set up and high integration ambitions are inspired by the 
model of the European Union (EU). West Africa’s sub-regional organizations: the 
Economic Community of the West African States (ECOWAS) and the Union Economique et 
Monétaire Ouest Africaine (UEMOA), are clear examples of this pattern of diffusion. 
However, African regionalism is often decried as ineffective, in particular in the domain of 
trade and economic cooperation. Two arguments have been usually put forward in order 
to explain the simultaneous adoption of the EU model of integration in Africa and its 
mixed outcomes: constructivist scholars have emphasized normative tensions, while area 
studies specialists have focused on the neo-patrimonial nature of African politics. Looking 
at West Africa as a case study, this article argues that both perspectives have limits. 
Structural constraints and sociological institutionalist theory appear more appropriate in 
order to account for the mixed record of regionalism in Africa. It is argued that these 
challenges seem to be less specifically ‘African’ than usually thought.  
 
Keywords: regional integration, Africa, ECOWAS, UEMOA, European Union, institutional 
sociology   
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Introduction 
African regionalism exhibits contradictory trends. On the one hand, since decolonization, 
the continent has seen the birth of a large number of regional cooperation and 
integration initiatives, with many formal organizations established, both at the 
continental and at the sub-continental level. On the other hand, African regionalism is 
often decried as ineffective or inappropriate to the challenges that it is supposed to meet.  
The conflict management dimension of African regionalism has in the last few years 
attracted a lot of scholarly attention. However, most African regional organizations, 
particularly the eight sub-regional Regional Economic Communities (RECs) officially 
recognized by the African Union (AU), have been set up as organizations pursuing socio-
economic integration goals.  
Scholars have remarked that African leaders appear fascinated by regionalism, especially 
the kind of ‘deep’ and institutionally complex regionalism inspired by the example of the 
EU (Hancock 2014). Ambitious plans for economic integration have proliferated in Africa 
since independence. The 1991 Abuja treaty, for instance, which has brought sub-regional 
initiatives under a single framework, envisage the creation of an African Economic 
Community: the existing RECs should be merged by 2031 into a single market, where 
people and goods will be able to circulate freely, with a single currency overseen by an 
African central bank and a Pan-African Parliament with supra-national powers.  
However, these grandiose projects of integration have often had a mixed follow up. 
Twenty-five years after Abuja, in spite of significant financial and technical support from 
partners such as the EU and the African Development Bank (ADB), no REC has been able 
to set up a fully-fledged common market (Hancock 2014; De Melo and Tsikata 2014). 
Some regional schemes have never really taken off, but also the most dynamic 
organizations, such as the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and 
the East African Community (EAC), have a record of setting up deadlines that have been 
repeatedly missed or postponed. The number of regional organizations in Africa itself, 
rather than corroborating the vitality of African regionalism, is often seen as a sign of its 
incoherence and ineffectiveness (Fioramonti and Mattheis 2015; Franke 2007).  
In trying to explain why so many regional organizations have been established in Africa, 
many scholars have remarked on the influence of the EU and of its model of integration 
on the continent, in particular with respect to the institutional set up and the vision of 
integration as a linear succession of stages from a free trade area via a customs union to 
a common market (Clapham 2001; Gibbs 2009; Hancock 2014; Fioramonti and Mattheis 
2015). However, it has also been noticed that the mimicry of the EU model has often 
been superficial and shallow (Fioramonti and Mattheis 2015; Gibbs 2009; Söderbaum and 
Taylor 2008). The EU model in West Africa has suffered a ‘syndrome of partial 
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implementation’ (Van de Walle 2001) or, in other words, a decoupling between the 
nominal adoption of institutions and norms inspired by the EU-model and the everyday 
functioning of West African regionalism (Lenz 2013).  
Why have African leaders so often copied from Europe, and why has the result been 
mediocre? This paper tries to disentangle the puzzle of African regionalism by analysing 
the experience of West Africa. The sub-region has a long history of engagement with 
regionalism, but it also shares with the rest of Africa problems such as the overlap 
between different regional schemes, the repeated postponement or non implementation 
of regional commitments and lack of capacities.    
The purpose of the paper is twofold. First, it aims to close an empirical gap, by focusing 
on a sub-region that has received little attention in comparative regionalism studies. The 
main West African organizations, the Economic Community of West African States 
(ECOWAS), and the Union Economique et Monétaire Ouest Africaine (UEMOA) have been 
treated by the literature in a partial manner, with an almost exclusive focus on ECOWAS’ 
work in conflict management (i.e. Adebajo 2002; Aning 2004; Obi 2009) and a 
predominance of econometric studies for UEMOA (i.e. Carrère 2004; Guillaumont, 
Geourjon and Guérineau 2012). The analysis of the process of regional norm diffusion in 
West Africa allows one to give more historical depth to the discussion on interregional 
cooperation and to question a series of established myths on the normative power of 
Europe.  
Second, the article points to the limits of existing scholarship in accounting for why 
ECOWAS and UEMOA were created as organisations strongly inspired by the European 
model of integration and why they have often failed to fully emulate such model. It 
notably holds that explanations offered by constructivist scholars, which points to the 
clash of norms, and by Africanists, who focus on the predominance of informality and 
neopatrimonialism in Africa, are unable to explain the contradictions of African 
regionalism. It shows instead the usefulness of applying a sociological institutionalist 
approach, pioneered by scholars of Asian regionalism (Jetschke and Murray 2012) and of 
integrating political and economic analysis (Hancock 2014; De Melo and Tsikata 2014).  
The first part introduces the West African region and gives a general account of regional 
integration in West Africa and its record of success and failure. The second analyses the 
mechanisms through which regionalism in West Africa has been directly and indirectly 
influenced by the EU model of regional integration, both with respect to the decision to 
set up ECOWAS and UEMOA in the first place and as pertains to their subsequent 
development. The third part summarizes existing explanations for the failure of African 
organizations to perform as expected, concluding that they are ultimately unconvincing. 
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In the fourth part, the alternative explanation is put forward. The conclusion assesses the 
way forward for West African regionalism.         
 
ECOWAS and UEMOA  
West Africa is one of the most disadvantaged parts of the world in terms of economic 
development. With the exception of Nigeria, Ghana and Côte d’Ivoire, all sixteen West 
African states are considered Least Developed Countries (LDC). Most of the states that 
constitute the region exist as independent political entities only since the 1960s following 
the end of colonialism. There is a clear imbalance in demographic and economic terms 
between the small states of the region and Nigeria, which represents half of the West 
African population and more than half of its Gross National Product (GNP). Administrative 
capacity in West Africa is generally very low and corruption and clientelism are 
widespread. Not surprisingly the region has also experienced high levels of political 
instability, manifesting in coups d’état, internal conflicts and other forms of political 
violence. Since the 1990s, there has been a gradual process of political liberalization, but 
only a few states are democratic.  
In spite of this difficult political and economic environment, the region has been a 
laboratory for regional integration since the end of colonialism in the 1960s. By 1979, 
nearly 30 sub-regional organisations had been established: a number that rose to more 
than 40 by June 1990 (Franke 2007). Many of these organizations were short lived. 
Some still exist but have a limited scope in terms of membership (i.e. the Mano River 
Union) or mandate (i.e. the Permanent Interstates Committee for Drought Control in the 
Sahel). Two sub-regional schemes, however, exhibit high ambitions in both their 
geographical scope and mandate: the Economic Community of West African States 
(ECOWAS) and the Union Economique et Monétaire Ouest Africaine (UEMOA). The two 
organizations overlap in terms of membership (all UEMOA members are also ECOWAS 
members) and have interacted through history through rivalry, mutual emulation and 
cooperation.  
Founded in 1975 and thoroughly reformed in 1993 with the adoption of a new Treaty, 
ECOWAS groups all states in the region, with the exception of Mauritania, which withdrew 
its membership in 1999 in order to join the Arab Maghreb Union. UEMOA has a smaller 
membership: it comprises of the former French colonies of West Africa with the exception 
of Guinea-Conakry (which is not a member, in spite of having experienced French 
colonization) and of Guinea Bissau, the only non French-speaking member.   
There are historical reasons for the co-existence in West Africa of ECOWAS and UEMOA. 
Although the organization itself was founded only in 1996, UEMOA’s roots are much older 
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than ECOWAS’. French-speaking West African countries have since colonial times, shared 
a single currency (the CFA Franc), managed by the Banque Centrale des Etats de 
l’Afrique de l’Ouest (BCEAO) and by the French Treasury and pegged first to the French 
Franc and later to the Euro. In 1972 these countries created the Communauté 
Economique de l’Afrique de l’Ouest (CEAO), the direct predecessor of UEMOA.  In 
contrast, ECOWAS was part of the wave of African regional organizations established in 
the 1970s, inspired by the ideal of Panafricanism that accompanied the independence of 
many African countries.  
When they were founded in the 1970s, ECOWAS and CEAO’s mandate focused on 
economic integration. The 1975 ECOWAS Treaty foresaw the elimination of restrictions 
on trade between member states and the subsequent establishment of a Common 
External Tariff (CET) (ECOWAS 1975). The CEAO Treaty took a similar although more 
modest approach, foreseeing the complete liberalization of trade in the field of raw 
materials, while industrial products fell under a preferential tariff (Van de Walle 1991). In 
response to both international challenges and international developments, however, both 
organizations underwent a process of reform in the 1990s. ECOWAS adopted a new 
treaty in 1993 and CEAO was merged with the CFA monetary union and was transformed 
into UEMOA in 1996.  
The post Cold War history of ECOWAS has been deeply shaped by the decision taken in 
1990 to deploy a military mission, the ECOWAS Monitoring Group (ECOMOG), in order to 
stop the first Liberian civil war, although the 1975 Treaty had no provisions allowing the 
organization to lead such an intervention (Adebajo 2002). Following the ECOMOG 
experience, ECOWAS developed a series of activities targeting governance and security 
issues, which have been institutionalized with the adoption of the 1993 ECOWAS Treaty; 
the 1999 Protocol Relating to the Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management, 
Resolution, Peace-Keeping and Security (PRMCR) and the 2001 ECOWAS Protocol on 
Democracy and Good Governance (Aning, Birikorang and Jaye 2010). By contrast, 
UEMOA has continued to focus on socio-economic issues. Its mandate has been 
expanded and reinforced with respect to CEAO and encompasses the creation of a 
common market and the harmonization of legislation (UEMOA 2003).    
As a consequence of these developments, a regional ‘division of labour’ has emerged. 
ECOWAS has today a de facto regional mandate on high politics and security cooperation. 
In the realm of socio-economic integration, on the other hand, although ECOWAS is the 
recognized REC for West Africa, there is an implicit acknowledgement that, given its 
smaller and more cohesive membership and its common currency, UEMOA has a 
comparative advantage. The two organizations have committed to cooperate (ECOWAS 
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and UEMOA 2006), although rivalry and competition have not been completely 
eliminated.   
ECOWAS and UEMOA are neither fully fledged successes nor abrupt failures. In contrast 
to other African schemes that have never taken off, the two organizations do not exist 
just on paper but are significant regional players. Yet, they are affected by problems of 
organizational capacities, resources, ability to implement effectively their commitments 
and to push member states to comply with their decision. What is however particularly 
puzzling is that, while ECOWAS and UEMOA have scored significant successes in fields 
where they have invested themselves relatively recently such as conflict management 
and fiscal harmonization, West Africa has lagged behind with respect to what was the key 
goal of ECOWAS at the time of its creation: the reduction and eventual elimination of 
obstacles to the free movement of persons, services and capital.  
Until the 1990s, ECOWAS achieved very little and its Trade Liberalization Scheme never 
really took off (Kufuor 2006). In spite of these failures, the 1993 treaty, being sequel to 
the Abuja Treaty at the continental level, has not only reaffirmed economic integration 
goals but has even scaled up ambitions leading to the ‘establishment of a common 
market’ and of an economic union, including a monetary union, as its long term 
objectives (ECOWAS 1993, 3d and 3e). The realization of the goals of such provisions has 
however, experienced very significant delays. The ECOWAS Free Trade Area was 
launched only in 2010 and the ECOWAS Customs Union was launched at the beginning of 
2015 under very strong external pressure.1 Plans for the introduction of a common 
currency have never taken off and even the more modest ambition of having ECOWAS 
countries achieving macroeconomic convergence criteria has failed (Interview, ECOWAS 
Commission, 23 October 2013). The difficulties of ECOWAS in the domain of socio-
economic integration are in part tempered by better results achieved by the more 
restricted group of French-speaking countries. With major support from the EU and 
France, UEMOA’s customs union was adopted as scheduled in 2000, but implementation 
issues persist. A recent independent inquiry found that ‘the transport of goods is still 
hampered by all sorts of regular or occasional issues’ and that ‘common external tariffs 
are still reproduced in an imperfect manner in the information systems of the States’ 
customs offices’ (Guillaumont, Geourjon and Guérineau 2012, 12).  
A problem with the partial implementation of ECOWAS and UEMOA texts is also evident 
with respect to another key agenda of the two organizations – securing the free 
movement of persons across West Africa. For ECOWAS, the adoption in 1978 of a 
Protocol on the free movement of persons, residence and establishment was one of the 
very few achievements of the organization before the end of the Cold War (Adepoju 
                                                          
1 See next paragraph for the role of the EU in pushing for the adoption of the ECOWAS customs union. 
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2002). UEMOA has also launched its own free circulation scheme, which on paper is even 
more advanced than ECOWAS’. Yet, in disregard of the ECOWAS and UEMOA legislation, 
customs officials routinely demand fees from people and transporters that go through the 
borders (Observatoire des Pratiques Anormales 2011).  
ECOWAS’ and UEMOA’s difficulties in getting their provisions implemented on the ground 
stem in part from the difficulties that their respective Courts of Justice have in 
sanctioning non compliance. Although the Court of UEMOA has powers on paper that are 
equivalent to the Court of Justice of the EU’s (Sall 2006), it has been unable to perform 
an equivalent role, because it has received few complaints (Interview, UEMOA 
Commission, 16 October 2013). The ECOWAS Court has been strengthened by a 2005 
Protocol that has given it jurisdiction over human rights complaints presented by 
individual citizens (Alter et al 2013). Yet, such a decision has had the paradoxical 
consequence that the Court has been absorbed by human rights complaints and has paid 
very little attention to its original mission of getting community regulations on economic 
integration implemented (Alter et al. 2013).      
The two organizations’ parliaments have suffered a similar fate: although they exist on 
paper, they play a marginal role in the activities of the regional organizations. The 
ECOWAS Parliament was inaugurated in 2000 and is now at the end of its third 
legislature, but, contrarily to what was stated in the 1994 Protocol that provided for its 
creation (ECOWAS 1994), it has never been directly elected. With the adoption of the 
Supplementary Act of December 2014 it is hoped that the power of co-decision now 
accorded the ECOWAS Parliament will be translated into actual legislative, budgetary and 
oversight roles. UEMOA amended in 2003 its Treaty in order to transform its Inter-
parliamentary Committee into a fully-fledged elected parliament. However, more than 
ten years after, the UEMOA Parliament has still to be inaugurated.      
In conclusion, the evolution of the two organizations has not been linear and incremental 
and socio-economic cooperation has not ‘spilled-over’ to political integration: rather, the 
latter has advanced while the former was lagging behind. Moreover, ECOWAS and 
UEMOA have developed organizations that do not manage to work as expected, such as 
their courts and parliaments. 
In order to understand the evolution of the two organisations and some of their 
institutional and policy choices, the next part explores the process that has led to the 
diffusion of the European model of regional integration and to the transfer of institutions 
and norms to West Africa.     
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The EU’s influence on West Africa  
While the influence of the EU on the region has not been the only factor that has led to 
the creation of West African regional organizations, it has been a prominent one. The 
institutional inspiration of the ‘model EU’ on ECOWAS and UEMOA is easily discernible, 
starting from the institutional set up of the two organizations. Like the EU, the two 
organizations have an organ composed of the heads of state and governments of the 
region, a council of ministers, a commission, a court of justice and a parliament. While 
institutional similarities were already present in the treaties stipulated in the 1970s, the 
process of reform of ECOWAS and the transformation of CEAO into UEMOA have made 
institutional isomorphism even more evident, as most innovations have aimed at 
conferring more powers on regional institutions and increase their supranational 
dimension (Kufuor, 2006; Sall, 2006). For instance, the executive organs of the two 
organizations, initially called secretariats, have been transformed into commissions 
following the example of the EU. The UEMOA Commission, in particular, has been called 
‘a pure and simple carbon copy of the European Commission’ (Sall 2006, 83).  
However, influence goes beyond institutional isomorphism to encompass some of the 
normative and policy choices of the two organizations. ECOWAS and UEMOA share with 
the EU the objective to create ‘an ever closer union’: to build a common regional market, 
underscored by important elements of political cooperation, rather than limit themselves 
to a loosely formalized interstate cooperation, as has been the case for some other non-
European regional organizations. The influence of the then European Economic 
Community (EEC) is evident in several aspects of the founding ECOWAS treaty, 
particularly the fact that the organization put socio-economic integration at the centre of 
its mandate and adopted an incremental scheme. The EEC inspiration is also evident in 
the establishment of sectorial policies and in the will to give ECOWAS a ‘solidarist’ 
dimension, establishing a compensation fund. The 1993 Treaty reinforces the objective of 
‘deep’ integration and seems to bear the mark of the parallel debate within Europe on 
how to make regional integration more democratic and participative. It reshapes the 
normative underpinning of ECOWAS, mentioning the ‘recognition promotion and 
protection of human and peoples' rights’ (ECOWAS 1993, 4g) and the ‘promotion and 
consolidation of a democratic system of governance’ (ECOWAS 1993, 4j) among the 
goals of the organization. It tries to advance societal participation in ECOWAS’ activities, 
paying more attention to the private sector and to civil society actors (ECOWAS 1993, 
4k). UEMOA, on its part, has embraced the EU-promoted model of ‘open regionalism’ and 
has championed a reduction of trade barriers with the rest of the world (Grimm 1999). 
Moreover, as the CFA is pegged to the Euro, the organization has put macro-economic 
surveillance and monetary stability at the centre of its agenda, copying the EU practices 
in this domain. BCEAO monetary policies follow strictly the European Central Bank’s and 
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the organization’s system of surveillance reproduces the criteria of the Maastricht Treaty 
on fiscal deficit and inflation (Grimm 1999; Claeys and Sindzingre 2003). 
The process of diffusion of regional institutions and norms in West Africa has been 
actively fuelled by the engagement of the EU itself, especially if the term ‘EU’ is used in a 
broad way to encompass the EEC and the EU member states. On several important 
respects, the case of West Africa contradicts most accounts about how the normative 
power of Europe operates in the diffusion of regionalism. Studies conducted on norm 
diffusion in regional integration emphasize the importance of mechanisms of diffusion of 
the ‘EU model’ that are fully non-coercive and, in some cases, even independent of the 
will of the EU itself. The logic of appropriateness – socialization, persuasion and 
emulation – has a major role in the International Relations (IR) debate on the diffusion of 
regionalism, at the expense of the logic of consequentialism – the more direct 
mechanisms of manipulation of utility calculation (Börzel and Risse 2009). However, this 
second logic appears not to have been exclusive but highly relevant to West Africa as 
Table 1 (summarizing the emulation of the EU model by ECOWAS and UEMOA) shows. 
 
Table 1: EU influence on regional integration in West Africa  
 ECOWAS UEMOA 
INSTITUTION
AL SETTING 
Mimicry of the EU model. Logic of 
appropriateness. 
Direct involvement of EU officials in 
the drafting of the UEMOA treaty. 
Financial aid and technical assistance 
aiming at supporting the 
establishment of the new organization.  
 
Mimicry of the EU model. 
Logic of consequentialism + logic of 
appropriateness. 
NORMATIVE 
FRAMEWORK 
Political dialogue. Conditionality of aid 
towards member states. Funding of 
pro-democracy/human security 
activities. Recognition by ECOWAS 
officials of the importance of 
democratic values in regional 
governance (only partly motivated by 
the EU example). 
Logic of consequentialism + logic of 
appropriateness. 
Nothing to remark (the EU regards 
only ECOWAS as a political actor; 
UEMOA lacks an articulate normative 
framework). 
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CONFLICT 
PREVENTION, 
MANAGEMENT 
AND 
RESOLUTION 
No role of the EU in the initial 
conception and establishment of 
ECOWAS peace and security mandate 
(no equivalent in the EU model). 
Funding currently provided to ECOWAS 
peace and security mandate. Possible 
introduction of EU concerns (terrorism, 
migration) in ECOWAS security policies 
following EU involvement.  
Logic of consequentialism 
Nothing to remark (the organization 
has currently no mandate on peace 
and security). 
ECONOMIC 
INTEGRATION  
Mimicry of the EU model. EPA 
negotiations. 
Logic of consequentialism + logic of 
appropriateness. 
Direct involvement of EU officials in 
the drafting of the UEMOA treaty. 
Financial aid and technical assistance 
aiming at supporting the 
establishment of the new organization. 
Pegging of the CFA Franc to the 
UEMOA. Mimicking of the EU model. 
Logic of consequentialism + logic of 
appropriateness (but logic of 
consequentialism predominant). 
SOLIDARITY 
AND HUMAN 
AND SOCIAL 
DEVELOPMENT 
Emulation of EU model (directly and 
through emulation of UEMOA).  
Logic of appropriateness 
Direct involvement of EU officials in 
the drafting of the UEMOA treaty. 
Financial aid and technical assistance 
aiming at supporting the 
establishment of the new organization. 
Emulation of EU model. 
Logic of consequentialism + logic of 
appropriateness  
 
The EU is also presumed to have been largely disinterested in spreading its own model 
before the end of the Cold War. According to Börzel and Risse, with respect to Sub-
Saharan Africa, it would have always limited itself to supporting existing local initiatives, 
with ‘no single incident in which the EU has been able to initiate genuinely new forms of 
regional integration’ (Börzel and Risse 2009, 10). A close look at the history of West 
Africa shows however that the EEC was directly and willingly implicated in promoting 
regionalism in West Africa since the 1960s, when its own regional project was still at the 
beginning. The EEC explicitly earmarked aid to support regional cooperation among 
French-speaking African states through its 1963 Yaoundé Convention with the Associated 
 
14 
African and Malagasy States. Interregional cooperation subsequently scaled up with the 
Lomé Convention of 1975, when the EEC/Africa Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) partnership 
was established with the adhesion of the Anglophone African states. West Africa received 
more funding for regional cooperation than any other sub-region under the five Lomé 
Conventions and the amount of aid constantly increased through the 1970s and 1980s 
(Coste and Egg 1998).  
Moreover, the importance of the heritage of European colonialism casts a shadow on the 
extent to which ‘local initiatives’ can be considered really local and points to the role of 
EU member states, particularly France, in initiating regional cooperation among West 
African states. The case of CEAO/ UEMOA clearly illustrates this phenomenon. Through 
the creation of the CFA monetary union, France was the real initiator of cooperation 
between French-speaking West African countries. Although the CFA zone was initially a 
heritage of colonial policy, and not an example of diffusion of a European model of 
regionalism, the line blurred as France subsequently pushed the EEC to support 
cooperation among the West African members of the CFA zone. The creation of CEAO 
was encouraged by France to create an alternative to what it saw as a Nigeria-dominated 
ECOWAS and to establish a fait accompli in Francophone West Africa before Great 
Britain’s entry into the EEC (Asante 1985, 76). Stressing the continuity between the 
colonial and the post-colonial era, Asante notices that Jacques David, an EEC official and 
former French colonial administrator, played a key role in the drafting of the CEAO 
treaty. David was explicitly motivated by his conviction that the EU model provided a 
‘recipe for economic prosperity’ (quoted in Asante 1985, 83) for Africa.  
Similar dynamics have underscored the creation of CEAO’s successor UEMOA, which is 
also seen both as an ‘EU creature’ and a tropical carbon copy of the EU by specialists of 
the region (Grimm 1999; Claeys and Sindzingre 2003; Sall 2006). Like David twenty 
years before, EEC/EU officials, particularly General Secretary of the European 
Commission Emile Noël, were directly involved in the drafting of the treaty of the UEMOA 
(Grimm 1999, 1). Moreover, Grimm finds that more than two thirds of UEMOA’s budget 
in 1998 was funded by the EU (Grimm 1999, 16).  
In contrast to CEAO/UEMOA, the creation of ECOWAS follows more closely the path of  
‘third-order effects’ of the ideational diffusion of the EU model, where ‘local actors loosely 
draw on EU-type norms and practices and advance them ‘as their own’, with no direct 
involvement by EU actors’ (Lenz 2013, 217). In the process that led to the creation of 
ECOWAS, the influence of the EU was notably mediated through ‘regional epistemic 
communities attached to international organizations’, particularly the United Nations 
Economic Commission for Africa (UNECA) (Asante 1986). The fathers of ECOWAS were 
African policy-makers and intellectuals. The Nigerian civil servant and academic Adebajo 
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Adedeji played a special part (Adebajo 2014). The organization received very little 
financial and technical support from the EEC/EU before the end of the Cold War and, 
even if the EU’s aid was later scaled up, it has never been responsible for more than 10% 
of the organization’s budget.  
ECOWAS was born as the result of the result of two, potentially contradictory, drivers of 
African integration: the ideology of Pan-Africanism and the imitation of the European 
example. It was a compromise between two strands of regionalism: what has been called 
‘developmental cooperation and integration’, inspired by the ideals of self reliance then 
popular in Africa, and the EU-style ‘market integration approach to regional integration’ 
(Gibbs 2009, 705). The EU’s influence is openly acknowledged by Adedeji (Asante 1986, 
55-56), who, however, sees regional integration as a step to achieve his ideas of self-
centred development and economic independence (Adebajo 2014).  
Since its creation, however, ECOWAS has evolved both from an institutional and a 
normative perspective and has become more receptive to the EU’s example. In 
particular, with the end of the Cold War the influence of dependence theory and self 
reliance ideals on ECOWAS has faded and the weight of liberal democratic norms has 
risen, as almost all West African countries have experienced some form of political 
opening. In addition, the dynamics of competition between ECOWAS and UEMOA have 
led ECOWAS to incorporate elements of the EU model by emulating its regional rival.  
As a result of the fact that ECOWAS’ initial ideological underpinning and of the rivalry 
between ECOWAS and CEAO/UEMOA, the EEC preferred initially to finance institutions 
with a low political profile. Under the Lomé 1 – Lomé 4 Conventions (1975-1995) 
ECOWAS received only 6% of regional funding. About 20% of the aid labelled as ‘regional 
aid’ went to the Permanent Interstates Committee for Drought Control in the Sahel 
(Coste and Egg 1998), a technical organization dealing with humanitarian and 
environmental issues. In the 1990s, UEMOA received most of EU support for regional 
integration, with ECOWAS relegated to a second order position (Grimm 1999). 
The interest of the EU in ECOWAS conflict management activities and the reform of the 
EU’s interregional cooperation conspired to change the EU’s attitude from the late 1990s 
onward. In 1998, the EU established and subsequently reinforced an institutionalized 
mechanism of political dialogue with ECOWAS (Nivet 2006). The Cotonou Agreement, 
which replaced the Lomé Convention in 2000, has signalled the EU’s intention to 
reinforce and reform its interregional cooperation, a commitment that has taken shape 
with the 9th (2000-2007) and 10th (2007-2013) European Development Fund (EDF). 
While UEMOA has also continued to receive EU funding, a substantial envelope has been 
earmarked to support ECOWAS. EU programmed aid has been shared among economic 
integration and peace and governance activities. The 2007-2013 Regional Indicative 
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Programme (RIP) dedicated about 70% of regional funds to economic integration and 
20% to peace and governance issues. The 2014-2020 RIP formally designates peace and 
stability as first priority issues, but shares the resources similarly, with about 50% 
dedicated to economic and trade integration, 25% to natural resources management and 
20% to peace and security issues (EU 2015).   
Apart from aid, a powerful instrument for the EU to influence West African integration 
has been the litany of negotiation rounds of an Economic Partnership Agreement (EPA), 
which aimed at reforming the Lomé trade regime, incompatible with the rules of the 
World Trade Organization (WTO). Due to its status as a REC, ECOWAS officially 
conducted the negotiations, with UEMOA participating as observer. As in other African 
sub-regions, trade negotiations have engendered much controversy (Farrell 2005; 
Stevens 2008). They have stalled for many years and their initial impact on regional 
integration has been negative. With the expiration of the deadline given by the World 
Trade Organization (WTO) to remove the old trade regime, West Africa has fallen under 
four different trade regimes – Everything but Arms initiative for the Low Development 
Countries (LDC), two different interim EPAs for Ghana and Côte d’Ivoire and the 
Generalized System of Preferences for Nigeria and Cape Verde.  
However, the EPA negotiations have been a tool for the EU to pressure ECOWAS to 
advance with its economic integration agenda, both through the threat to withdraw 
market access and through the offer of economic incentives. Indeed, the necessity to 
conclude an agreement as a whole block has forced ECOWAS to finalize the launching of 
its customs union after a long and difficult discussion between the English and French 
speaking members (Interview, ECOWAS Commission, 2013). The EPA was signed at the 
beginning of 2014, while the ECOWAS customs union has just entered into force. While 
ECOWAS countries have obtained the commitment of the EU to launch a large aid 
programme supporting the implementation of the agreement in exchange for the signing 
of the EPA, the EPA episode is a new example of quasi-coercive, rather than ideational, 
influence of the EU on regional integration in West Africa.      
 
The existing explanations for failed mimicry 
The attraction of the EU model for West Africa and the active role played by the EU in the 
sub-region, have created a fertile terrain for institutional diffusion. Why then have West 
African organizations deviated from the EU model in important respects?  
International relations (IR) scholars have tended to explain the phenomena of decoupling 
and selective adoption of external models as the consequence of a conflict between 
international and local norms, such as the currency common outside Europe of the 
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principle of state sovereignty and anti-colonial ideas (Acharya 2004). Although this 
literature has had Asia as its initial empirical referent, there have been efforts to apply 
such a framework of analysis to African regionalism. For instance, Paul Williams has 
discussed the evolution of the AU security culture, which he interprets as a complex shift 
from a normative framework based on the principle of non-intervention to non-
indifference (Williams 2007).  
The norm-based explanation is, however, much less satisfactory if brought from the AU 
to the sub-regional level of African regionalism and from the domain of security to 
economic regionalism. It is true that the ideals of African self-reliance that underpinned 
the creation of ECOWAS clashed in several important respects with the EU vision of 
integration. Moreover, at the time of the establishment of ECOWAS most West African 
rulers believed that regional cooperation should not encroach on state sovereignty. 
However, the importance of self-reliance ideals on West African regionalism largely faded 
away after the end of the Cold War. In contrast to other regional blocks, after the 1990s 
ECOWAS and UEMOA countries have not articulated an inter-governmental conception of 
integration. On the other hand, they have strengthened supranationalism in their treaties 
concluded in the 1990s and have not been reluctant to relinquish sovereignty in some 
specific areas. In the peace and security domain, ECOWAS is arguably more, and not 
less, supranational than the EU. Its peace and security architecture, modelled not on the 
EU but on the UN’s Security Council, can mandate peace enforcement operations in a 
member state upon a decision taken through qualified majority (Aning, Birikoyan and 
Jaye 2010). Similarly, UEMOA’s monetary policy is fully controlled by the BCEAO and the 
organization has gone further than the EU in challenging state sovereignty in specific 
policy domains, such as the harmonization of tax laws.   
Africanist literature offers a different view of African regionalism, which at first seems 
more promising. Two related perspectives have dominated the Africanist debate. The first 
has insisted on the predominance of informality in Africa (Bøås, Marchand and Shaw 
1999; Bach 2003), while a second strand has looked at African regional organizations 
through the lenses of neo-patrimonial theory (Söderbaum 2004; Söderbaum and Taylor 
2008; Gibb 2009).  
The first perspective argues that the weakness of formal institutions and the existence of 
important informal dynamics pose a major obstacle to EU-style regional integration in 
Sub-Saharan Africa (Bach 2003; Bøås, Marchand, and Shaw 1999). Notably, West Africa 
is depicted as a region where ‘the state’s legitimacy to define rules and laws for and 
prescribe them to society is openly challenged and often ignored by large parts of the 
population’, with the consequence that ‘integration through law’ becomes ‘a very shaky 
construction’ (Grimm 1999, 24). The literature has very much focused on informal 
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regional phenomenon such as informal trans-border economic activities, illicit trade flows 
and warlordism (Bøås, Marchand, and Shaw 1999). For instance, the literature has 
pointed to the importance of informal trade flows in West Africa, which might be three 
times larger than formal trade (Bach 2003).  
Theories focusing on the predominance of informality have however some limits. First, 
informal dynamics can work both ways. Some informal practices, such as petty 
corruption at state borders and smuggling networks that exploit differences in trade and 
monetary policies, clearly endanger formal regional integration (Bach 2003). Informal 
trade and non recorded immigration can however also strengthen the regional economy 
and sustain a sense of regional identity among the population. Second, arguments based 
on informality, while they can explain why the EU model has not performed well, are 
much weaker at accounting for its enduring popularity and its emulation by West African 
organizations.  
Scholars such as Fredrik Söderbaum (2004), Richard Gibb (2009) and Ian Taylor 
(Söderbaum and Taylor 2008; Taylor and Williams 2008) have offered a complementary 
explanation, which aims at accounting for both the adoption of regionalism and its mixed 
achievements. Neo-patrimonial theory underpins their reasoning. Söderbaum, Gibb and 
Taylor focus on African elites and argue that, because of their subordinate position in the 
international system, these elites see the formal adoption of foreign models as a way to 
boost their international legitimacy and obtain foreign ‘resources of extraversion’, such as 
development aid and military cooperation. Yet, they may not be seriously interested in 
successfully appropriating those models. The outcome is a project that is not really 
‘owned’ by the actors involved or, at best, a syndrome of partial reform, where local 
actors implement only those components of a foreign-sponsored agenda that do not 
endanger their interests and their entrenched governance practices, depleting it of its 
substance. Both Gibb and Söderbaum strongly insist on the symbolic and ceremonial 
dimensions of regionalism and argue that ‘regime boosting regionalism’ (Söderbaum 
2004) reinforces neo-patrimonial regimes since ‘belonging to a formal, states structured, 
regional organisation is interpreted as an important symbol of the virility of sovereignty, 
as regional integration is based on and presupposes formal state sovereignty’ (Gibb 
2009, 716).  
Although EU-Africa cooperation is officially built around the notion of ‘partnership’, 
Africanist scholars also notice that the relations between Europe and Africa continue to be 
shaped by the huge difference in economic and political power between the two 
continents. They contend that the EU is using its considerable power to diffuse, whether 
deliberately or not, a model of regionalism that is inappropriate to Sub-Saharan Africa. In 
this sense, the spread of regionalism is but the last chapter in a history marked by many 
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failed attempts at transferring foreign models of political and economic governance to 
Sub-Saharan Africa, including colonialism, post-colonial state building and structural 
adjustment (Gibb 2009, 702). ‘Neoliberal regionalism’ is seen as ‘a distinctive “project”, 
with a highly political content, fashioned and pursued by identifiable actors, institutions 
and interests’ (Söderbaum and Taylor 2008, 26). However, such a project is bound to 
fail, since political elites in Sub-Saharan Africa implement neoliberal regionalism in a 
partial and superficial manner. 
The value of the neo-patrimonial perspective is that it shows the insufficiencies of 
functionalist theories of integration in accounting for the complexity of West African 
regionalism and points to the importance of politics and the state. It also has the merit of 
putting the diffusion of regionalism in historical perspective, stressing its post-colonial 
dimension and its continuity with a history of transfer of Western models to Africa. Gibb, 
Söderbaum and Taylor also avoid portraying the EU as the innocent ‘gold standard’ of 
integration, seeing it instead as an actor actively engaged in promoting a model of 
regionalism mismatched to African realities (Gibb 2009; Söderbaum and Taylor 2008).  
However, there are several problems with their perspective. First, Gibbs and Söderbaum 
depict African regional organization as an emanation of the interests of their member 
states, denying any autonomy to regional institutions. This is a vision that seems to be 
anchored in outdated realist IR approaches and is contradicted by a massive amount of 
research on international organizations. The picture that they paint of African regionalism 
is moreover static and exaggeratedly bleak. Gibb, for instance, characterize African 
regionalism as ‘virtually unbroken failure’ and sees only a ‘litany of failed and collapsed 
African regional agreements’ (Gibb 2009, 705) in the varied continental picture. What 
seems to be ignored is both the fact that the performance of regional organizations in 
Africa has varied very much across organizations and across domains of intervention and 
that regional integration is everywhere, including in Europe, an enterprise fraught with 
difficulties and false starts. Like constructivist IR scholars, Gibb and Söderbaum also 
underestimate the extent of the transfer of sovereignty to West African organizations by 
their member states. The normative and institutional evolution of organizations such as 
ECOWAS and UEMOA is denied any relevance. Initiatives such as the adoption of the 
ECOWAS Protocol on Democracy and Human Rights or the attribution of a human rights 
mandate to the ECOWAS Court of Justice are seen as superficial actions aiming at 
reinforcing international legitimacy and attracting founding from donors, ignoring 
empirical research which paint a more positive and nuanced picture (Cowell 2011; Alter 
et. al. 2013). In the end, it is difficult not to see in much Africanist writing on regionalism 
the influence of a culturalist prejudice, which tends to reduce all African political reality to 
‘informal practices of social and cultural origin’ (De Sardan 2010, 421). Such a reductive 
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vision ignores both the complexity of African reality and the need for a comparative 
contextualization.   
 
Structural mismatch and normative emulation 
The pessimistic and critical vision of African regionalism that has dominated the literature 
has portrayed the failures of African regional institutions at following the EU model as a 
demonstration of the intrinsically dysfunctional nature of politics in Africa. One badge of 
problems, however, are the economic and structural bases for integration: while these 
are discussed in depth by the economic literature (i.e. De Melo and Tsikata 2014), they 
have received insufficient attention from political scientists.2 If the implementation of 
regional commitment might not advance, but even endanger, developmental goals, then 
the lack of determination of African rulers to make regionalism succeed might be less a 
product of the nature of the state in Africa and its neo-patrimonial dysfunctions and more 
the outcome of legitimate political-economic concerns and divergences of interests, not 
different from those that have slowed down or blocked integration in other parts of the 
world, including Europe.  
Most of the conditions that economists consider necessary for customs unions to have 
sizeable economic benefits, such as high levels of pre-union trade and a large number of 
economically strong members, are not met in African regional groupings (Hancock 2014; 
De Melo and Tsikata 2014). In the case of West Africa in particular, the overall economic 
structure, based on the export of natural resources towards more industrialized 
countries, does not facilitate regional integration. West African states do not produce 
many goods that can be sold on the regional market and there is little complementarity 
between the economies of the region. Indeed, ECOWAS and UEMOA trade much more 
with the EU than within themselves (see figures 1 and 2). 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
2 Gibb (2009) includes a discussion of the economic and structural basis for integration in Africa and of its 
potential economic impact, but subsequently ignores these constraints in his analysis of the African state. 
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Figure 1: ECOWAS intraregional exports and exports to the EU 
 
 
Figure 2: UEMOA intraregional exports and exports to the EU 
 
The different stance of the Francophone and Anglophone states with respect to 
protectionism and monetary policy has further complicated integration across the two 
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blocks. Such a gap was one of the major factors accounting for the failure of ECOWAS’ 
first Trade Liberalization Scheme and has recently slowed the process of the 
establishment of a customs union. 
Another problem is the difference in size, population and economic importance between 
West African countries. Internal ECOWAS and UEMOA trade is not only small but tends to 
be dominated by a few countries: Nigeria on the one hand, and Côte d’Ivoire and 
Senegal on the other (see figures 3 and 4). 
 
 
 
Figure 3: Dominance of Nigerian exports within ECOWAS  
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Figure 4: Dominance of exports from Côte d’Ivoire and Senegal within UEMOA 
  
Under such circumstances, there is a strong case to argue that regional integration in 
Africa carries less potential gains and more risks than in highly developed regions of the 
world, both in the form of trade diversion and in terms of the danger that integration 
might disproportionately benefit the already most industrialized states (Draper 2012; De 
Melo and Tsikata 2014).   
The experience of French speaking West Africa, which has gone further than ECOWAS in 
following, with apparent success, the EU model, is interesting in this respect. There are 
doubts about the long term impact of UEMOA and its predecessor CEAO in increasing 
intra-regional trade and in stimulating development in the absence of a structural 
transformation of its economies. Some authors have argued that the CEAO/UEMOA 
liberalization schemes coupled with the effect of the monetary union have been effective 
in enhancing trade in the current UEMOA area (Carrère 2004). However, intra-regional 
UEMOA trade remains low and most of the volume of trade is represented by Côte 
d’Ivoire and Senegal (UNECA 2010). Indeed, the fact that the two countries profited 
disproportionately from the CEAO integration scheme was one of the reasons for the 
crisis of the organization in the late 1980s (Van de Walle 1991).  Moreover, UEMOA 
countries, with the exception of Côte d’Ivoire, are still LDCs and their growth rates in the 
last thirty years have been lower than the rest of Sub-Saharan Africa (Guillaumont, 
Geourjon and Guérineau 2012). These low growth rates are in part attributable to 
specific historical events, such as the effects of the devaluation of the CFA and the long 
phase of conflict and political unrest that has affected Côte d’Ivoire. However, the fact 
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that, while unsuccessful at promoting growth, UEMOA countries have been successful in 
maintaining low inflation rates suggests also that the monetary union and the emulation 
of the EU model might have encouraged them to prioritize macroeconomic stability over 
development.     
If economic regionalism in Africa carries more dangers than benefits, why have so many 
organizations been set up and why have they been so resilient? Gibbs and Söderbaum 
view, which posits that regionalism in Africa has been often more effective in boosting 
international legitimacy than in addressing real-existing problems, captures in this case 
parts of the truth. It is however necessary to nuance their argument in two ways.  
First, a long term perspective shows that some sub-regions of Africa have undergone 
significant external pressures in order to adopt a specific model of integration. At least 
for some organizations like UEMOA, the range of choices has been constrained by the 
heritage of colonialism and by the fact that the EEC/EU alongside former colonial power 
have often intervened very directly in the integration process. UEMOA members are 
among the poorest and weakest states in the world and they appear to have had limited 
leverage vis à vis their international partners.  
Second, it is not necessary to develop theories based on African politics’ allegedly unique 
characteristics in order to explain the mimicking by West African institutions of the EU 
model. Indeed, such a phenomenon can be seen through the lenses of organizational 
sociology (Meyer and Rowan 1977; Di Maggio and Powell 1983; Pritchett, Woolcock and 
Andrews 2012). This literature sees institutional organizations as systems that ‘reflect the 
myths of their institutional environments instead of the demands of their work activities’ 
(Meyer and Rowan 1977, 341). They are created to conform to successful models of 
organization that are considered legitimate, and their behaviour is driven by a concern 
for legitimacy rather than a preoccupation with efficiency (Jetschke 2009: 409; see also 
Pritchett, Woolcock and Andrews 2012). From a theoretical point of view, normative 
emulation is distinct from lesson drawing, which implies that the model is seen as 
providing effective solutions (Jetschke and Murray 2012: 180), although empirically the 
distinction might not always be clear cut.  
The attraction of isomorphic regionalism is by no means exclusive to Sub-Saharan Africa. 
Recent literature on the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), for instance, 
has underscored that, contrarily to the previous emphasis on ASEAN as an alternative 
model of integration, ASEAN, like ECOWAS and UEMOA, has tended to mimic the EU 
selectively. Even more interestingly, in ASEAN also, the adoption of foreign institutions 
has been motivated by, inter alia, the desire to attract foreign resources and has resulted 
in the launching of ‘‘oversized’ projects’ and in a ‘record of inefficiency and 
implementation failures’ (Jetschke 2009: 409).      
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The incentives for seeking legitimacy through institutional isomorphism are however 
higher in Sub-Saharan Africa, than in other regions given the lack of material resources 
that shape the African reality and the dependence on foreign aid. However, this strategy 
has arguably stifled the development of institutions and practices that are endogenous 
and really adapted to the West African context (Pritchett, Woolcock and Andrews 2012). 
In this respect, African regional organizations experience problems that are similar to 
those experienced by African nation-state institutions, whose exogenous origin and 
‘disconnect’ from their citizens has been frequently alluded to (Englebert 2000; Moore 
2004)   
Exogenous development and institutional mimicry also lead to persistent capacity gaps in 
formal institutions, as organizations tend to enlarge their mandate to new tasks that they 
are not able to discharge (Moore 2004; Pritchett, Woolcock and Andrews 2012). Indeed, 
lack of capacity, both in quantitative and qualitative terms, is one of the most frequent 
complaints of the ECOWAS and UEMOA Commissions and of their external partners. The 
Commission of UEMOA, although its powers and prerogatives have been carbon-copied 
from the EU, has around 400 staff. As UEMOA officials themselves remark, this is more or 
less the same number of staff members of the EU Directorate of Internal Market 
(Interview, UEMOA official, 14 October 2013). For several years, the ECOWAS 
Commission has been understaffed because of a freeze on its process of recruitment of 
permanent staff after some problems of mismanagement had been detected (Personal 
correspondence, ECOWAS official, October 2013).   
ECOWAS’ and UEMOA’s quest for increasing their legitimacy and continuing to mimic the 
EU model directly or by emulating each other, has increased the risk of overburdening. 
For instance, in order to bring regional integration closer to the people UEMOA launched 
two Regional Economic Programmes (PER I and PER II) from 2006, designed by the 
Commission and jointly implemented by the organization and its member states. The 
activities financed by the PERs are very much inspired by correspondent EU Programmes 
(such as INTERREG and Erasmus) and it has been widely acknowledged that through the 
PERs UEMOA wants to do a ‘job in the EU structural funds style’ (Interview, Official of an 
EU member state embassy, Ouagadougou, 18 October 2013). However, several donors 
have argued that UEMOA is overburdening itself and that the implementation of the PERs 
should be delegated more frequently to member states and NGOs (Interview, Official of 
an EU member state embassy, Ouagadougou, 18 October 2013; Interview, official of a 
development agency, 17 October 2013, Ouagadougou). Competition between the two 
organizations and the logic of symbolic emulation are pushing ECOWAS to, in turn, 
launch a Community Development Programme, which was adopted by the Conference of 
ECOWAS Heads of State and Government in July 2013 in Accra. While some of the 
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actions carried as part of the programme might be beneficial to the region, they bear 
similar risks of capacity overstretching.  
 
The future of African regionalism  
Culturalist explanations focusing on the neo-patrimonial character of African political 
culture tends to be over-deterministic in predicting failure and dysfunctional behaviour. 
If, on the other hand, Africa is caught in a ‘institutional mimicry trap’, the road ahead is 
difficult but might not be so bleak.     
Significantly, ECOWAS and UEMOA have scored their major successes in the fields where 
they have least imitated the EU model. ECOWAS has been a pioneer among regional 
organizations in pursuing a peace and security agenda that has developed as a response 
to specific local challenges, and not as the adoption of an abstract external model. With 
regard to the recent engagement of the ECOWAS Court of Justice in the fields of human 
rights, recent research suggests that scepticism is misplaced and that the Court has 
shown a real willingness to proscribe human rights violations (Alter et al 2013). In the 
case of UEMOA, the fact that the organization’s work on fiscal harmonization has 
proceeded quite well can be arguably attributed to the fact that member states 
considered it important to strengthen their taxation system after the fiscal crisis that they 
experienced in the 1990s.    
Regardless of the fact that West African officials have hitherto regarded the EU as a 
model, there are positive signs that the Euro-crisis might stimulate a more critical way of 
thinking. During some of the interviews conducted for the present study, a number of 
high ranking officials stressed the need for ECOWAS and UEMOA to take some distance 
from the EU and ‘be more innovative’ (Interview, ECOWAS senior staff, 23 October; 
Interview, West African politician, 29 July 2013). Although the process of retaking 
ownership of their own regionalism is primarily a responsibility of West Africans, the role 
of external partners should not be to offer lessons but to facilitate such a reflection. In 
particular, there is an urgent need for the EU to rethink its regional integration aid to 
West Africa.  
Since the EU has stepped up its support for West African regional institutions, ECOWAS’ 
and UEMOA’s difficulties in absorbing and managing EU aid have emerged as a major 
issue (EU 2009). Because of ECOWAS’ and UEMOA’s limited administrative capacities 
much of EU funding earmarked never reaches them, but goes to external partners, such 
as international organizations and NGOs. Mindful that the EU continues to attach 
complicated procedures to its aid, officials from both ECOWAS and UEMOA often find it 
easier to work with national cooperation agencies (Interview, ECOWAS senior staff, 23 
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October; Interview Official of an EU member state embassy, Ouagadougou, 18 October 
2013). In response to ECOWAS’ and UEMOA’s limitations, EU aid has been increasingly 
targeted at capacity building, through activities such as trainings and seminars 
(Interview EU Delegation to Nigeria and ECOWAS 2013). At the same time, however, 
many ECOWAS and UEMOA officials express scepticism about these activities and see the 
shortage of permanent staff and bureaucratic dysfunction, rather than lack of proper 
training, as their true problems (Interview, ECOWAS senior staff, 23 October; Interview, 
UEMOA staff). Rather than earmarking large amounts of aid that cannot be managed by 
regional institutions and that increases the phenomenon of institutional overburdening, 
the EU should give less and better.  
Moreover, at a moment when European countries themselves are increasingly 
questioning the benefits of economic and monetary integration, it is important that the 
EU integrates a reflection on the actual gains of integration and on the most appropriate 
regional model for LDCs in its inter-regional policy. During the first phase of regional 
cooperation in Africa, the influence of the EU model, with its over-emphasis on trade and 
economic issues, had negative implications. This might have led African sub-regional 
organizations to set unrealistic economic goals and neglect key governance and security 
issues (Clapham 2001, 59). While the EU has more recently recognized the importance of 
ECOWAS’ conflict management activities, in the socio-economic domain its action has 
continued to be guided by the implicit assumption that EU-styled regionalism is good for 
the region. In particular, the launching of the ECOWAS customs union has been almost 
forced on West Africa by the EU, through the EPA negotiations, and welcomed as a 
success irrespectively of its actual impact on the regional economy. While the new RIP for 
2014-2020 incorporates (to some extent) the concern for reinforcing ECOWAS and 
UEMOA capacities to absorb aid, it continues to be underpinned by the belief that the 
creation of a common market will be unambiguously beneficial to West Africa. A 
reflection on an appropriate monetary policy for UEMOA member states and on the actual 
economic consequences of the ECOWAS custom union has hitherto been lacking. With 
special attention to the English-speaking ECOWAS countries (which have lowered their 
external tariffs as a consequence of the introduction of the CET), concerns are being 
raised about the effects on food security and key industrial productions, for instance of 
pharmaceutics products.  
Finally, regional integration should be judged according to the benefits that it can bring 
to Africa, and not in relation to the achievement of symbolic milestones. It is the 
responsibility of the African elite to find a model of regional cooperation adapted to the 
region’s needs and of the added value of external partners to support, or at least not to 
pose obstacles in the attainment of set goals.  
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